Ability matching and occupational choice by Jonathan James
working
paper
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
11  25
Ability Matching and Occupational 
Choice
Jonathan JamesWorking papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to the 
formal editorial review accorded ofﬁ  cial Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views stated 
herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Working papers are available on the Cleveland Fed’s website at: 
www.clevelandfed.org/research.Working Paper 11-25 October 2011
Ability Matching and Occupational Choice
Jonathan James
This paper develops and estimates an individual model of occupational choice 
and learning that allows for correlated learning across occupation-speciﬁ  c abili-
ties. As an individual learns about their occupation-speciﬁ  c ability in one occu-
pation, this experience will be broadly informative about their abilities in all oc-
cupations. Workers continually process their entire history of information, which 
they use to determine when to change careers, as well as which new career to go 
to. Endogenizing information in this manner has been computationally prohibi-
tive in the past. I estimate the model in an innovative way using the Expecta-
tion and Maximization (EM) algorithm. The model is estimated on the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997. The estimates suggest that both direct and 
indirect learning play an important role in early career wage growth, with those 
with the lowest levels of education achieving the largest increases.
JEL codes: J24, J31, J62
Keywords: Occupational choice, correlated learning, dynamic discrete choice, 
expectation and maximization algorithm.
Jonathan James is at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. He can be reached 
at jwj8@duke.edu. He is grateful to Peter Arcidiacono, Joe Hotz, and Pat Bayer 
for providing advice, comments, and encouragement. He extends special thanks 
to seminar participants at Duke University, UNC-Chapel Hill, the University of 
Pittsburgh, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland for helpful comments and 
feedback. 1 Introduction
A salient feature of the labor market is the high degree of occupational mobility of younger workers.
Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) nd that male workers, ages 23-28 with at most a high school
degree have a 30% chance of changing occupations in a given year, even when occupation is dened
using a very broad level of aggregation (the census 1-digit level). The leading models that address
this feature of the labor market are the occupational matching models of Miller (1984), Neal
(1999), and Pavan (2009). These models, along with the job shopping literature of Johnson (1978),
Jovanovic (1979), and Topel and Ward (1992), argue that this high frequency of occupational
change is the result of an experimentation and learning process that younger workers undergo to
search across dierent types of employment to nd their comparative advantage.
These matching models have provided a powerful framework for understanding early career
occupational mobility and wage growth. However, with few exceptions (e.g. Shaw (1987)), this
literature has made the strong assumption that the nature of occupational match is exclusively
occupation specic. This independence assumption implies that as an individual learns about their
ability in one occupation, this experience provides no additional information about their ability in
any other occupation. While this simplifying assumption eases the computational burden of these
models, it unfortunately severely limits how much we can learn about occupational sorting and
mobility and it's implications for worker welfare.1
This paper develops and estimates an occupational matching model that relaxes this assumption
of independence. Namely, occupational matches will share a robust correlation structure, such that
as a worker learns about their ability in one occupation, it will be informative about their abilities
in all occupations. Relaxing this assumption fundamentally changes the worker's problem, greatly
broadening the model's usefulness and our understanding of why workers change occupations.
The focus of the previous literature has been on occupational mobility due to learning about a
1Learning models outside of labor economics also have assumed independence. For example, Crawford and Shum
(2005) evaluate a pharmaceutical matching model in which patients are uncertain about their innate responsiveness
to Anti-ulcer medications. The patients experience with their current medication does not aect their choice of
subsequent medications. Likewise, Ackerberg (2003) assumes independence in an advertising and learning model over
yogurt products. Allowing for correlation in his model modies the consumers problem in a number of interesting
ways.
2poor match. An important contribution of the paper is that by relaxing the independence assump-
tion, we are able to generalize the role of learning to account for many new patterns of mobility that
we observe in the data. Specically, the model will be able to additionally rationalize 1) occupa-
tional changes due to promotion, where high ability workers change occupations precisely because
they are high ability, 2) occupational clustering, where workers may tend to switch occupations
between a handful of apparently similar occupations (e.g. between business operations occupations
and professional occupations), and 3) occupational cycling, where workers leave an occupation,
only to return a few periods later.2 In more general terms, the correlated learning modies the
workers problem in an ingenious way so that learning now has an important two dimensional role
of aecting the decision to change occupations as well as driving the decision of which occupation
to go to next.3 Generalizing the learning framework to account for these other mobility patterns is
an important step for understanding more thoroughly how workers substitute across dierent types
of employment.
The second contribution of the paper is that it extends the occupational matching literature by
simultaneously endogenizing the education decision along with occupational choice and learning.
The previous literature abstracts from the education decision and estimates models on individuals
with homogenous education. Miller (1984) argues that the data indicates that college graduates
appear to make more informed decisions about occupational matches than high school graduates.
The ability matching model allows individuals to have heterogeneous ability for schooling. In an
intuitive way, through the occupational correlation structure, the model allows schooling ability to
be informative about prospective occupational matches. Endogenizing education in this manner will
provide important insight into the relationship between educational attainment, the occupational
learning process, and the source of information dierentials among education groups.
The nal contribution of the paper is methodological. Allowing occupation specic ability
to be correlated across occupations comes at a huge computational cost. First, the number of
2Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) show that about 30% of occupational changers actually return to their previous
1-digit occupation within four years.
3The independence assumption allows workers to leave occupations because of poor matches, but it does not
explain how they choose new occupations because independence means workers view all occupations as ex-ante
identical.
3parameters are increasing in the number of occupations, with which traditional approaches require
jointly maximizing a large set of parameters. Second, since abilities are unobserved, we are required
to integrate this high dimensional correlated unobservable out of the data. Finally, the size of the
state space is overwhelming, containing all potential beliefs about occupational abilities, such that
solving the dynamic model is extremely dicult.
These three features independently are challenging but combined make traditional methods
computationally infeasible. I address these challenges by estimating the model using the expec-
tation and maximization (EM) algorithm. The EM algorithm greatly simplies the problem by
allowing many of the model parameters to be estimated separately, avoiding joint maximization.
Furthermore, it eliminates the need to perform the high dimensional correlated integration and
replaces it with a set of single dimensional integrals, which conveniently admit a closed form ex-
pression. Perhaps most important, is that by utilizing the EM algorithm, the computational burden
only increases linearly in the number of occupations (as oppose to exponentially with traditional
methods). This allows the empirical model to accommodate a large number of occupations avoiding
coarsely aggregating occupations into a smaller set.4 Finally, as shown in Arcidiacono and Miller
(2010), the EM algorithm provides a means to recover consistent estimates of conditional choice
probability (CCP's) with unobserved state variables, which can be used to tractably estimate the
dynamic structural choice model.
I estimate the model using the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY97). The empirical model allows for a large choice set where individuals choose among ten
occupations. The NLSY97 data is invaluable for a model that requires a richer detail of occupations.
A highly documented issue with its counterparts is the prevalence of spurious occupational changes.
The data issues are largely due to how the data is gathered. The occupation instruments in the
NLSY97 data are collected in such a way to reasonably avoid these measurement issues.
4Avoiding coarse aggregation of occupations (e.g. blue collar and white collar) is highly desirable in the context of
the learning model. Aggregation assumes that human capital (i.e. schooling, experience, and occupational ability) is
perfectly transferable among the grouped occupations, which if untrue will bias many of the primitives of the learning
model. For example, if an individual learns they have a bad match as a restaurant waiter and changes careers to
become a welder, which they learn they have a high ability in, then when these occupations are aggregated to blue
collar, the model will interpret these wage increases as returns to tenure when they are actually returns to search. A
more thorough discussion of misspecication bias is presented in appendix A.
4The estimates on the distribution of abilities suggests that workers can potentially achieve large
wage increases by nding occupations they are well suited for. Furthermore, the estimates of the
covariance implies that correlation is important to the learning process. In addition, the correlation
between schooling ability and the occupational abilities suggest that as workers learn about their
schooling ability, this generates very dierent beliefs about expected abilities across occupations.
Using the parameter estimates, I simulate careers to further investigate the role of sorting on
ability by educational group and it's inuence on wage growth. The simulations show that high
school dropouts and high school graduates are more likely to change occupations and more likely
to sort on ability than college graduates. Consequently, workers without a college degree achieve
the greatest increases in wages due to sorting, where within the initial years of their careers (8-9
years labor market experience), sorting on ability attributes to an increase of wages of 9.5% for high
school drops and 7.5% for high school graduates, compared to 5.2% for college graduates. Previous
work (e.g. Miller (1984)) concluded that more informed career decisions resulted in the infrequent
occupational mobility of college graduates. However, the results from the simulations suggest
a dierent interpretation, which is that college graduates are less likely to change occupations
because sorting on ability is less important to these workers and occupational changes are driven
by other factors. For example, a college graduate may be more likely to stay in a poorly matched
occupation because the returns to their college degree are higher in that occupation.
A number of recent papers have aimed at allowing for correlated learning in empirical work.
Antonovics and Golan (2011); Sanders (2010) allow for correlation in occupational learning models.
There method utilizes information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to construct a measure of
manual and cognitive skills for each occupation following Yamaguchi (2010). The correlation matrix
is constructed from these two measured factors and learning is reduced to these two dimensions.
The empirical approach in this paper is to have each occupation represent it's own factor, where the
correlated learning is over J factors (the number of occupations in the economy). In addition, the
correlation among these J factors is estimated rather than drawn from auxiliary data. Dickstein
(2011) uses a dierent approach to allow for correlated learning among anti-depressant medications.
He incorporates correlation into the dynamic allocation index rule used in Miller (1984). One
5drawback of this approach is that any additional factors (observed or unobserved) cannot aect
the dynamic decision process because the optimal choice is based solely on learning parameters,
abstracting from anything else in the utility function (in particular any unobserved random utility
shocks).
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2, I discuss the details of the occupational
choice model with ability matching. Section 3 outlines the two stage estimation strategy using
the EM algorithm that uncovers the structural parameters. Section 4 will discuss the population
extracted from the NLSY97 data. Section 5 reveals the empirical results. Section 6 simulates data
from the parameter estimates to investigate the relationship between sorting on ability and wage
growth with an emphasis on it's link to educational attainment. Finally section 7 concludes.
2 Ability Matching Model of Occupation Choice
This section outlines the dynamic career decision model. The essential feature of the model is
that workers vary in their innate skills and abilities for each occupation in the economy and most
importantly, these unique occupation specic abilities are unknown to the worker when they begin
their career. Workers are able to learn about their occupation specic abilities through direct
experience. In addition as workers are learning about their ability in one occupation, they will be
able to make inferences about their abilities in all occupations by exploiting a known correlation
structure between occupational abilities. This section rst describes the occupational ability match
vector and how it relates to wages, as well as the learning process. Then, it details the dynamic
occupational choice model.
2.1 Ability Matches
The economy consists of J distinct (but potentially related) occupations. Workers have an innate
ability for each of the J occupations. We can uniquely characterize an individual by their vector
of ability endowments,
Mi = [ i1 ; i2 ; ; iJ ; is ]
0 (1)
6where i1 represents individual i's ability in occupation 1, with i2 being their ability in occupation
2, etc. Two important features of the ability endowment drive career decisions. First, the ability
vector is initially unknown to the individual, and second, the components of the ability endowment
are not independent.
The nal term in the ability vector, is, represents individual i's ability or preference for school.
Similar to Belzil and Hansen (2002); Keane and Wolpin (1997) this is a heterogenous term which
aects the utility for attending school in the form of additional cost.5 This component will play a
prominent role in the workers problem because, like the occupational abilities, school ability is not
independent.


































where   is a vector containing the mean of occupational abilities in the population. s represents
the mean of schooling ability. The covariance is the partition of the three terms, , 2
s, and sJ. 
is the occupation ability covariance matrix. It's dimension is JxJ. 2
s is the variance of schooling
ability, and sJ is the covariance between schooling ability and each of the occupational abilities.
If workers have rational expectations, this covariance structure is going to play a critical role
in the workers learning process. Specically, workers will not only learn about their ability in the
occupations they have direct experience in, but they will also be able to exploit this covariance
structure to make inferences about their abilities in other occupations. Likewise, if schooling ability
is correlated with any of the occupational abilities, as workers learn about their schooling ability,
this will also provide valuable information about their abilities in the various occupations.
The covariance structure is an important element in the model because it's sparseness (dense-
5The model is agnostic about what this term actually represents, however for consistency it will be referred to as
schooling ability (where it could also be referred to as schooling match, schooling preference, or schooling cost).
7ness) represents the importance of comparative (absolute) advantage. In one case, if abilities are
highly correlated, then ecient search becomes less important since the individual's problem ef-
fectively reduces to a single dimension. Any path of experience will eectively yield the same
information, where they are discovering whether they are a high type or a low type. In the other
extreme case, if abilities are only loosely correlated, then ecient search becomes a critical part of
the career process as workers seek to nd their comparative advantage. In this case, the experi-
ence path matters. As workers gain labor market experience, it becomes more costly for them to
experiment with new careers because this likely results in the loss of accumulated human capital
in their current occupation. The fact that searching later in the career is more costly places more
importance on strategically nding a good occupational match early in the career.
Going forward, it's assumed that when individuals begin making decisions in the model, their
schooling ability is known.6 Knowing their schooling ability, is, workers can use the distributional
parameters to form updated beliefs about their occupational abilities. Letting fEit(Mi);Vit(Mi)g
indicate the mean and variance, which completely characterizes their beliefs about their ability
vector given information up to date t, then their beliefs at (t = 1) are described by,
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where the last line of equation (3) is the conditional distribution of a multivariate normal, whose
resulting distribution is also multivariate normal.
This generates an important degree of heterogeneity across individuals in their beliefs about
their occupation specic abilities. Likewise, it creates an important link between education decisions
and occupational search patterns.
6This may be due to the fact that they either actually know this value, or they have learned it through a sucient
number of years of school.
82.2 Wages and Learning
Workers possess dierent types of accumulated human capital (e.g. education and work experi-
ence). Each occupation utilizes these forms of human capital in a unique way, so the individual's
productivity will vary by occupation. In a similar way, their occupation specic ability will also
aect productivity. Following the literature on productivity wages, if a worker is employed in oc-
cupation j 2 J, they are paid their occupation specic marginal product with log-wage described
by.
w(hit;ij;ijt) = hitj + ij + ijt (4)
where i subscripts the individual, t the time period, and j the occupation. The term, hit, rep-
resents the individual's vector of accumulated human capital, including experience in the various
occupations and education at date t. j is the occupation specic return for the dierent types of
accumulated human capital. Their occupation specic ability is represented by ij. The term ijt
is an individual, occupation specic, transitory technology shock to wages.
Since occupational ability is additive in the log-wage equation, it has a very clear interpretation
as a percentage dierence in wages, such that an individual with a value of ij = 0:1 enjoys a 10%
higher wage in occupation j, all else equal, while an individual with ij =  0:1 has 10% lower
wages.
When an individual works in occupation j, they observe their wage. Following Miller (1984)
and Jovanovic (1979), what they do not observe is the individual values of the random variables,
ij and ijt. They can only observe their sum by dierencing (wijt  hitj) = (ij +ijt). Workers
are extremely interested in knowing their occupational ability because it is a potentially large (or
negative), persistent component aecting future returns in that occupation. Given this noisy signal,
individuals make inferences about their abilities via Bayes' rule, using their priors and knowledge
of the distribution of the technology shock,
The technology shock ijt represents the noise of the ability signal. This random variable has
9an occupation specic variance that is normally distributed and i:i:d: across time and individuals.
ijt  N(0;2
j) 8 j 2 f1;2; ;Jg
Occupations dier in the variance of the technology shock, implying that productivity in some
occupations may be more or less inuenced by transitory factors. In occupations with low 2
j, the
individual will be able to infer their occupation ability match faster than occupations with a high
transitory noise. Taken to the extreme, if 2
j = 0, then the worker will be able to infer their ability
from a single wage observation. From the worker's perspective, one dimension occupations can be
classied is along fast learning and slow learning occupations, which is dictated by 2
j.
A second dimension in which occupations dier is how informative their abilities are about the
abilities in other occupations. Workers distinguish between high information occupations and low
information occupations. High information occupations are not only informative about the own
occupation ability but also provide information about abilities across occupations. Low information
occupations are those that only provide information about the own occupation ability.
In the model, workers only observe their productivity (wage) after they choose an occupation.7
This means that when workers make career decisions they choose occupations based on expected
wages, taking into account what they have learned so far in their career. The details of the decision
process are outlined in section 2.3, the emphasis here is to highlight that workers are precluded from
receiving multiple wage signals simultaneously and must incur the cost of accepting a job in order
to acquire information. If this were not the case, workers observe all of their productivities for each
occupation in each period, in which learning would simply be a product of time and individuals
require no strategy to eciently seek out information.
When a worker observes an ability signal they update their beliefs recursively using Bayes's rule.
Their posterior beliefs are a function of their initial beliefs, the noisy signal of their ability , and the
known distribution of the technology shock corresponding to the occupation they worked. Degroot
(1970) outlines the updating formulas given a normally distributed prior and normally distributed
7Other models of occupational choice like Keane and Wolpin (1997); Sullivan (2010) assume individuals observe
all of their potential wages for each occupation in each period prior to making a choice.
10signal. The updated beliefs can be described in matrix form using the following notation. Let















; if (dit 1 = j)
0 ; otherwise
it 1Jx1 is a sparse vector that contains all zeros except in the jth position, which has the
ability signal of occupation j. it 1JxJ is a sparse matrix with zeros everywhere except in the (j;j)
element, which contains the inverse of the occupation j technology shock variance.
Given this vector and matrix, using the previous periods beliefs about occupation ability, which
are multivariate normal described by their mean Eit 1(Mi) and covariance Vit 1(Mi), the poste-














The previous periods beliefs take into account the entire past sequence of outcomes and choices as
well as their initial priors, therefore it is sucient to only condition on the previous periods beliefs,
rather than the entire history. Also, equation (5) demonstrates that if an individual receives no
signal (does not work) then the update simply returns the prior.
2.3 A Dynamic Model of Career Decisions with Learning
The dynamic occupational choice model shares a similar framework to other structural occupational
choice models like Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Sullivan (2010). The distinguishing dierence is
that individuals now face uncertainty over their occupation specic abilities, and given their forward
looking behavior, workers seek an optimal career path to eciently learn about their unknown
abilities.
From age 16 (t = 1) until age T, individuals make career decisions to maximize expected life-
time utility. In each period, individuals make a discrete decision dit 2 fu;s;1;2; ;Jg among
11J + 2 mutually exclusive alternatives, where d = u is unemployment (home production), d = s is
attending school, and d = j, for each j 2 f1;2; ;Jg, is employment in occupation j. Each choice
is associated with a current period utility ud() and a non-pecuniary random utility shock "d, which
is additive and i:i:d: across choices and time, so the per-period pay-o for choice d is, ud() + "d
2.3.1 Employment: d 2 f1;2; ;Jg
The per-period utility associated with employment in occupation j is,
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This expression contains a constant, j1, which represents the non-pecuniary benets of being
employed in occupation j. An entry cost, j2, if the worker did not work in occupation j in the
previous period, and j3, an additional entry cost if the worker has never worked in occupation j.
Each parameter is occupation specic except for the parameter on expected utility of wages, w,
which is the same regardless of the source of the wage.8
An important departure from previous work is that workers are not assumed to be maximizing
expected lifetime wages. Rather, because workers face a high degree of uncertainty in this model,
it is likely that risk plays an important role in career decisions. Assuming workers cannot save,
they put all of their wages into consumption. A risk averse worker may be unwilling to try their
hand in a new occupation in which their is a good chance they may receive a very low wage and
thus lower consumption. The iso-elastic utility specication in equation (6) allows risk over wages
to inuence workers' decisions. Risk aversion is measured by the constant relative risk aversion
parameter . If  = 0, then workers are expected wage maximizers.
8Recall that equation (6) has exp(w) as the argument because w represents log wage.
12Following the expression from equation (4), log wages are given by,
w(hit;ij;ijt) = hitj + ij + ijt (7)
=j1 + j2(ed) + j3(ed2=100) + j4(Exprj > 0)
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Exprk is the sum of other labor market experience excluding j.
Deriving the expression for the expected utility of wages for occupation j using the expression



































where the last line follows from the fact that the sum of the two unknown random components,
the occupation j ability, ij, and the transitory productivity shock, ijt, are normally distributed,
making wages distributed log-normal. The term Eit(ij) in equation (8) represents the individual's
marginal expectation about their ability in occupation j given all of the available information at
time t and likewise Vit(ij) represents the marginal variance.
Contemporaneously, risk aversion is an additional search friction similar to the other entry costs.
However, risk aversion may also play a role intertemporally as occupations deliver very dierent
consumption streams through the returns to accumulated human capital. If workers are risk averse,
they may nd occupations with initially steeper returns to tenure more attractive than those with
returns that have a more gradual prole.
132.3.2 Schooling and Unemployment: d 2 fs;ug
If the individual chooses schooling in period t they receive ow utility.
uist() =s1 + s2(AttCOL) + s3(ReentryHS)
+ s4(ReentryCOL) + s5is
Schooling preference depends on (AttCOL) which indicates whether the individual is attending
college, (ReentryHS) and (ReentryCOL) represents the re-entry cost if the individual was not
enrolled in school in the previous period. Finally, the utility of schooling will be aected by school
ability is.
The mean ow utility of unemployment is normalized to zero (i.e. uiut = 0).
2.3.3 Value Functions
Let Sit represent individual i's state vector at time t. This includes all of the variables relevant to
the individuals decision, which given the current specication is years of education, labor market
experience for each occupation j, the previous periods decision, dit 1, and their beliefs about their
occupational ability, Eit(Mi) and Vit(Mi). Furthermore, let "it be the J+2 current period random
utility shocks, "u;s;1;2;;J
Workers seek to maximize the expected discounted sum of future utility. Let Vt(Sit;"it) be
the value function for a worker in a particular state at time t when they make optimal decisions.
Given that time is nite, VT+1() = 0. With discount of future utility , we can represent the value




fuc(Sit) + "c + EVt+1(Sit+1;"it+1jSit;dit = c)g (9)
The expectation is taken over next periods utility shocks, ", as well as all possible realization of the
occupational ability signals, , if they chooses one of the employment options, which eects their
beliefs in the next period. The other state variables, education and labor market experience evolve
14deterministically, but are endogenous to the choice.
Letting vct() represent the conditional value function, which is the mean pay-o for each choice,
excluding the current periods error term dened as,
vct(Sit) = uc(Sit) + EVt+1(Sit+1;"it+1jSit;dit = c)
8c 2 fu;s;1;2; ;Jg (10)
then the individual's optimal choice in period t, d




fvct(Sit) + "ictg (11)
Dynamics play an important role in the individual's decision process. Since the information
the individual receives is conditional on the choice, individuals strategically make career decisions
which are likely to give them the best information. In Miller (1984) individuals have an incentive
early on to try out occupations where the ability match distribution has a low mean, but high
variance because this could potentially lead to very valuable information if the individual's talent
happens to be in the upper tail of the distribution.9 Consequently, embedded in this maximization
problem is an optimal search strategy in which individuals strategically search over occupations to
eciently learn about their innate abilities.
3 Estimation
The ability matching model possess a number of features that make estimation challenging. These
problems are rooted in the fact that many components in the model grow exponentially complex
in the number of occupations. A popular method seen in the literature to address this curse of
9Most interesting is that relaxing the independence assumption actually generates a potentially new set of optimal
career paths than found in the previous literature. Consider a worker choosing between two occupations. The
distribution of the unknown match value for occupation A is characterized by a high variance and low mean, while
the distribution for occupation B has a low variance and high mean. The optimal career path described in Miller
(1984) is for workers to always initially sort into occupation A, the high variance occupation, with the goal being that
this is the occupation with the greatest informational benet. However, if the occupational matches are correlated,
then the worker's optimal career path may be to initially sort into occupation B and through the correlation structure
learn about their match value in occupation A.
15dimensionality is to reduce the number of occupations by coarsely aggregating occupations into a
smaller set. Unfortunately, in the context of the learning model this is a particularly dangerous
approach because there is a serious risk of misspecication, which will bias nearly all of the model
parameters.10
In order to estimate the model allowing for a rich set of occupations, we require a new approach
which explicitly addresses the curse of dimensionality. The curse of dimensionality presents itself in
a number of ways. First, given that we do not observe the high dimensional vector of occupational
and schooling ability, we need to integrate over these correlated unobservables. With many occu-
pations this high-dimensional integration becomes increasingly dicult. The second computational
problem stems from the fact that nearly all of the parameters in the model are occupation specic.
With many occupations, this corresponds to many parameters. The burden of jointly estimating
all of these parameters simultaneously poses a major computational challenge, in particular when
using numerical gradient based methods. Finally, the state space in the model is continuous along
multiple dimensions as it includes all potential combinations of beliefs about occupational abilities.
Even if beliefs where the only state variable and for each occupation, beliefs were crudely gridded
to 10 points, then with 10 occupations the state space would contain over 10 billion combinations
of beliefs. Traditional full solution methods for solving dynamic discrete choice problems will not
be feasible.
The estimation strategy utilizes the Expectation and Maximization (EM) algorithm to over-
come these computational challenges. This approach breaks the curse of dimensionality so that the
computational complexity only grows linearly in the number of occupations, allowing many occu-
pations into the empirical model. Compared to traditional maximum likelihood, which attempts
to solve this extremely complex problem all at once, the EM algorithm can be viewed as a process
which breaks the larger (infeasible) problem up into a couple of smaller (feasible) problems, in par-
ticular an expectation step and a maximization step. By iterating between these two interlinked
steps, Dempster et al. (1977) show that the parameters converge to the same solution as numerical
maximum likelihood.11
10Misspecication bias and it's consequences are discussed in appendix A.
11A local maximum.
16With respect to the computational challenges outlined above, the EM algorithm breaks the
J dimensional correlated integral into J single dimensional integrals. Furthermore the maximiza-
tion becomes additively separable for each of the wage equations and the choice equation, allowing us
to estimate each set of parameters separately. Finally, as demonstrated by Arcidiacono and Miller
(2010), the EM algorithm provides a means to recover conditional choice probabilities (CCP's)
from the data in the case of unobserved state variables. Hotz and Miller (1993); Arcidiacono and
Miller (2010) show that CCP's can be used as an alternative representation of the expected future
value term, enabling us to solve the complicated dynamic structural model without solving the
optimization at every point in the state space.
The estimation is implemented in two stages. In the rst state, I use the EM algorithm to
recover all of the model parameters except the structural utility parameters. Rather than resolving
the structural model at each iteration of the algorithm, I replace the structural choice probabilities
with a exibly specied dynamic reduced form. Then, using the parameter estimates from the rst
stage, I estimate the dynamic structural model in the second stage. This section is broken into
three sub-sections. The rst describes the likelihood function and the challenges associated with
traditional maximum likelihood. The next sub-section describes the EM algorithm, including the
rst stage of estimation. Finally, using the rst stage estimates, I outline the estimation of the
dynamic structural model.
Normalizations
In addition to the standard normalizations associated with estimating discrete choice models12,
some additional parameters of the model are not identied. Specically, given that the ability
matches are random variables, the mean of occupation ability will not be separately identied from
the constant in the wage equation and the mean of schooling ability will not be separately identied
from the constant in the schooling utility. Therefore, the mean of the ability vectors,   and s, are
set to zero. In addition, since schooling match enters the utility for schooling as, s5is, the scale
of schooling ability, E(2
is), will not be identied separately from the coecient, s5. Therefore, I
12Only dierences in utility functions are identied, and the variance of the random utility shock is not identied
separately from the scale of the utility parameters
17normalize 2
s = 1.
3.1 The Likelihood Function
The likelihood function for individual i is characterized as the joint probability of the observed
career decisions dit 2 fu;s;1;2; ;Jg and realized wages, wit, for t = 1 to T, taking expectations




















H(~ 1; ; ~ J; ~ sj;sJ)
In equation (12), xit denotes the observed data, which eects choices and wages. bit represents
the unobserved beliefs the individual has about their occupational ability. The structural param-
eters are summarized by  2 f1; ;J;w;;sg, and the wage parameters are summarized by
 2 f1; ;J;1; ;Jg. The wage parameters enter the choice probabilities because expected
wages are a component of the employment ow utilities.
With expressions for the probability of the observed choices and wages, we need to integrate
out of the likelihood the unobserved ability vector, whose density is represented by H(). Given the
normality assumptions in the model and the normalizations stated previously, H() is parameterized
as,

















A striking feature of the model is that the true occupational abilities do not directly enter
into the probabilities of the observed choices. Instead, it is the beliefs about their occupational
abilities, bit, which drive choices. Intuitively what this means is that two individuals with identical
beliefs about their occupational abilities will make the same choices in probability, even though
18their occupational abilities may be completely dierent. Therefore, once we condition the choice
probabilities on the beliefs, we can pull this component outside of the multiple integration over the
occupational abilities. In rewriting the likelihood, it is then helpful to break the density H() into
the unconditional distribution of schooling, G(), and a conditional (on schooling) distribution of
occupational ability, F(). Where,
G(~ s)  N(0;1)
F(~ 1; ; ~ Jj~ s;;sJ)  N





The unobserved schooling ability plays an important role in the model. Not only does it
dictate individual's willingness to attend school, but it also inuences their initial expectations
about their occupational abilities. Rather than assuming this important unobservable is randomly
distributed across individuals, it is common practice in the literature to condition this unobservable
on potentially relevant information outside of the model.13 For estimation, unobserved schooling
ability is determined by,
is = zi + i (14)
s:t: E(is) = 0 and E(2
is)   E(is) = 1
Where zi is a vector of observed variables including highest grade completed by the mother and in-
formation about the highest grade completed by the individual at age 16.14  are parameters to be
estimated, and the residual  represents the remaining unobserved components and is distributed
N(0;2
). The equation is estimated with the normalizations as constraints. If the observed vari-
ables zi have no relation to is then all of the variance will be absorbed by the unexplained error,
13Keane and Wolpin (1997) allow the initial years of schooling at age 16 to aect the probability of the initial
conditions.
14Specically, zi includes the highest grade completed of the mother, an indicator if the highest grade completed
of the mother is missing, an indicator if the highest grade completed by the individual at age 16 is less than 9, and
an indicator if the highest grade complete by the individual at age 16 is greater than 9.




Pulling the choice probabilities out of the integration of the occupational abilities and replacing
the joint density H() with the conditional density F() for occupational abilities, and the density

























There are three issues which make directly maximizing the likelihood in equation (16) com-
putationally infeasible. First is the integration of the high dimensional correlated unobservables.
Second is the pervasiveness of the parameters. For example, the wage parameters enter into the
wage probabilities, the choice probabilities, as well as the belief functions. Even more challenging,
is the fact that the distributional parameters for the integration also enter in the choice probabil-
ities since they are components of the belief functions. Analytical gradients in this environment
are extremely dicult to calculate. This forces us to rely on numerical gradients for maximization
with which such a large parameter space is extremely slow.
The nal challenge to directly maximizing equation (16) is that at each guess of the parameters,
we need to solve the individual's optimization problem in order to evaluate the probabilities of the
observed choices. Not only does this require solving for all potential career paths, but it also
requires solving the value function for all potential realizations of occupational ability. Even using
non-full solution interpolation methods like Keane and Wolpin (1994), with large T and large J,
the complexity of the state space with such a large number of continuous variables is overwhelming
and even performing the backward recursion for one iteration of the maximization is extremely
20computationally intensive.
3.2 The EM Algorithm




























where, C = fu;s;1; ;Jg
In this version of the likelihood I have replaced the probabilities of the observed choices which
are rooted in the theoretical model and require solving the individuals optimization problem, with
a simpler function, 
, that can be viewed as a reduced form representation of the dynamic choice
probabilities. Rather than maximizing the structural parameters that best t the data, 
c is a
exible specication of the states, such that,

c(xit; ~ s) = Pr(dit = cjxit;bit; ~ s;;) (18)
for c 2 fu;s;1;2; ;Jg

c and it's parameters have no real meaning other than they characterize the observed choices
extremely well. This can be achieved with a exible enough specication of the state variables xit
and ~ s. It is important to notice that the beliefs nor the wage parameters enter into the function

. The reason beliefs are not included in this expression is that beliefs are simply complicated
(unknown) functions of the observed data (i.e. past wages) and unobserved schooling ability.
Including enough high order interactions of these variables, we will be able to distinguish how these
terms inuence choices, without having to solve for the beliefs explicitly. Ideally, if the choice
21probabilities are expressed as a robust function of the states, then including the beliefs will be
redundant. The same reasoning holds for excluding the wage parameters. Since expected wages
are just unknown functions of xit, it's relevance in the choice probability should be accounted for
with a exible enough specication of xit in 
.
The likelihood in equation (17) avoids the previously outlined problem of having to solve the
dynamic optimization problem at every guess of the parameters. By including 
, this acts as a
dynamic selection correction term and allows us to consistently estimate the other parameters in
the model. However, given the other challenges outlined (high dimensional integration, joint maxi-
mization of many parameters), maximizing equation (17) directly is impractical, if not infeasible.15
The EM algorithm provides a tractable alternative to maximizing equation (17) directly. The
benets of the EM algorithm are twofold. First, it allows us to separately estimate the choice
parameters apart from the wage parameters as well as each of the wage parameters independently.
This avoids the computational challenge of maximizing all of the parameters simultaneously. Sec-
ondly, it accommodates a simple closed form solution for the integration of the occupational ability
parameters such that solving for the wage parameters reduces to ordinary least squares.
The specics of the EM algorithm are best explained by reframing the likelihood as if all of the






1; if ~ s = is
0; otherwise
be an individual i specic density, with a mass point of one if the input, ~ s, equals their true
schooling ability and zero otherwise. Similarly, dene the individual density, fi as,




1; if ~ j = ij 8j 2 f1;2; ;Jg
0; otherwise
15Infeasibility becomes more likely with large J because this introduces many more parameters to the model to
exibly estimate 
.
22which has a mass point of one if the input vector, ~ 1; ~ 2; ; ~ J, equals their true vector of occu-
pational abilities.






































represent the continuous product of the inside expression evalu-
ated for dierent values of ~ 1; ~ 2; ; ~ J; ~ s over the support ( 1;1). It is the product equivalent
of the integral. As
Y
~ s
cycles through all potential values of schooling ability, the likelihood is mul-
tiplied by one if it is not evaluating the individual's data at their true type. Once it cycles to the










, is functioning in the same capacity. In the multi-dimensional case,
the continuous products are cycling over all dimensions of occupational ability. When the vector
is being evaluated at a point dierent than the true occupational ability, then it is multiplying the
likelihood by one. Once it cycles to the individual's true occupational ability vector, it returns the
associated likelihood value.
The benet of maximizing the likelihood in equation (19) is that it contains only products and
no sums. This means that when we take log's of the likelihood, the log operator passes completely
























 fi(~ 1; ~ 2; ; ~ J)

gi(~ s)
23Evaluating the likelihood in equation (20) is infeasible because we do know these individual fi
and gi densities. The EM algorithm is implemented by repeatedly maximizing the likelihood in
equation (20) and at each iteration, we plug in estimates of fi and gi ( ^ fi and ^ gi), which are formed
from the data and the parameter estimates of the previous iteration. Dempster et al. (1977) show
that solving for the parameters in this fashion is equivalent to maximizing equation (17) directly.
Given the mth iterations estimates of the parameters 
m, m, m, m
sJ, m, and m
 , the den-
sities ^ fm
i () and ^ gm
i () describe the probability distribution of the individuals unobserved abilities,
i1;i2; ;iJ;is, conditional on the observed data and the parameters. These densities are
calculated with Bayes' rule, using the population distribution as the prior and updating it with the
observed data.
First, the function ^ gm
i (~ s) is an estimated density describing the probability that an individual's
schooling ability takes a particular value ~ s. This density is formed by using the prior distribution,
given by ~ s  N(zi;()2), and updating it with the joint probability of the observed data
conditional on is = ~ s. This posterior distribution will likely not have an analytical solution. In
light of this, I use a discretized version of this distribution with K points of support. With K
suciently large, this discrete distribution approaches the continuous distribution.16
The discrete distribution of ^ gm
i (~ s) is given by K discrete points, denoted by  sk for k 2
f1;2; ;Kg, and K probabilities, denoted by qm
ik for k 2 f1;2; ;Kg. The K discrete points are
equidistant, covering [ 3;3] standard deviations of the schooling ability distribution. The bounds
associated with each point are,
(bk;bk) =
8
> > > > > > <






















if k = K
The probabilities, qm
ik, represent Pr(is =  sk) conditional on the mth iterations estimates of the
parameters. Without observing any choices or wages, the prior belief of this probability conditional
16In the empirical model, K = 25.























where () indicates the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.
Letting Pr(dij) denote the probability of all of the observed choice di 2 f di1,di2,,diTg and
Pr(wij) denote the probability of all of the observed wages, then using this information and the
prior above, qm






c ;  sk)Pr(wijxi;m;m;m
sJ;  sk) (22)







More specically, conditional on is =  sk and the mth iterations estimates of the reduced form
choice probabilities, 
m
c , the joint probability of the observed choices in equation (22) is,
Pr(dijxi;
m







c (xit;  sk)dit=c (23)
Conditional on is =  sk, the probability of the observed wages, Pr(wij), is found by expressing
the distribution of wi as a multi-variate normal and evaluating the pdf at the observed values. The
distribution will be dictated by the individual specic career paths, so it will be unique to each
worker. To give an example as to how this is constructed, assume a worker only works in periods
t,t0, and t00, such that dit = j, dit0 = j0, and dit00 = j00. The joint distribution of wages for this
25worker's observed wages, wi = [wit;wit0;wit00]0 and choices is,









































































































The probability of the observed wages wi is then found by evaluating the pdf at this point,
Pr(wijxi;m;m;m
sJ;  sk) (25)
= (2) 
#fwig






(wi    wi)0  w
 1
i (wi    wi)

where #fwig is the number of wage observations.
Turing now to the other density, ^ fm
i , which represents the distribution of the individual's
occupational ability. If we condition on the observed data and the mth iterations estimate of the
parameters,
^ fm
i (~ 1; ~ 2; ; ~ Jj~ s) (26)
= Pr(ij = ~ j 8j 2 f1;2; ;Jgjwi;xi; ~ s;m;m;m
sJ)
What is important about the density in equation (26) is rst the schooling ability, ~ s, is treated
as data, so the density is conditional on this value. The second feature is that the choices are not
included when we condition on the data (past wages). This goes back to the fact that individuals
condition their choices on their beliefs and not their real values of ability. Since beliefs are simply a
function of the past wages and their schooling ability, once we condition on these values in equation
(26), choices add no new information about the real value of abilities. Finally, the expression for the
density function, ^ fm
i , has a very familiar form. Since the updates in the EM algorithm are formed
using Bayes' rule, this distribution will be the same distribution as the beliefs the individuals have
26in the model once they condition on all of their wages (since the individuals are Bayesian updaters
also).
For each potential value of schooling  sk the density ^ fm
ik is dened as,
^ fm













































j )2 ; 8j 2 f1;2; ;Jg





t=1(dit = j)(wit   hitm
j )
(m
j )2 ; 8j 2 f1;2; ;Jg
^ Em
ik is the estimated mean of the occupational ability given: schooling ability equals  sk, the
parameters at iteration m, and the observed data. ^ Vm
ik is the estimated covariance. The principal
of the EM algorithm is that as we collect more data on an individual, the estimated covariance
goes to zero and the estimated mean goes to their true value.
^ fm
ik and qm
ik are individual densities. We can aggregate these up to get the population densities,


































ik(j;j0) represents the jth row and j0th column of the covariance matrix ^ Vm
ik, and ^ Em
ik(j) refers
to the jth element of the vector ^ Em
ik.






















s.t. E(zi) = 0
E((zi)2) + 2
 = 1
 is the cdf for the standard normal
The estimator for the initial conditions is an interval estimator, reecting the fact that we have a
continuous latent variable is, but we only know the probability that is falls within certain bounds
(i.e. qik represents the probability that is 2 [bk;bk]). The constrains enforce that the necessary
normalizations bind.
Implementing the EM algorithm requires the repeated computation of two steps, the expectation
(E-step) and the maximization (M-step). So far I have completely characterized the expectation
step, which describes the updates for ^ fm
ik, qm
ik, m, m
sJ, m, and m
 . These values are calcu-
lated outside of the maximization routine following the formulas outlined above. The remaining
parameters in the model are the functions for the reduced form choice probabilities, 
c, and the
parameters of the wage equation, . To update these parameters, we maximize the likelihood in
equation (20), plugging in the values derived in the expectation step. Equation (20) still has the
continuous integration of schooling ability, so I replace it with the discrete approximation, so that


























ik(~ 1; ~ 2; ; ~ J)

Two features of this likelihood function make it appealing to maximize. First the parameters

c, and the wage parameters, , are additively separable. This means that we can maximize these
two components of the likelihood separately, which avoids the computational burden of jointly




















c(xit;  sk)) (31)
The second attractive feature of the likelihood in equation (30) is that the wage observations
are no longer collectively tied together through a multivariate integral. Instead each wage is only
integrated over the occupational ability in that single occupation. We can replace the density,
^ fm
ik(~ 1; ~ 2; ; ~ J) with it's relevant marginal density, ^ fm




ik(j) and ^ Vm
ik(j;j) are dened in equation (28). Writing the probability of the observed



















ln(Pr(witjxit; ~ j;j;j)) ^ fm
















































wit   hitj   ^ Em
ik(j)
2
Equation (33) has a closed form solution for the integration of the unobserved occupational
ability. We can take advantage again of the additive separability in equation (30) and estimate the
wage parameters separately for each occupation. Plugging equation (33) into the the likelihood
in equation (30) and taking derivatives with respect to j and setting it equal to zero, gives the
17For the empirical work, the function 
c is exible a logit of the sate variables, xit and  sk.



















which is simply solved using weighted ordinary least squares.
Equation (34) provides a clear illustration of how the estimator addresses selection. ^ Em
ik(j) is an
individual specic mean. If individuals with high ability are more likely to have high tenure, then
this eect will be corrected for by the mean, rather than absorbed into the returns to tenure.

































The EM algorithm is used in the rst stage to solve for all of the model parameters except the
structural utility parameters. Instead, a reduced form logit model is used to account for dynamic
selection, postponing the estimation of the structural model to the second stage. The EM algorithm
breaks the joint likelihood in the parameters, allowing us to solve for the choice parameters and the
wage parameters separately. In addition, we are able to eliminate the multiple integration of the
occupational abilities and substituted it with a closed form for the expectation so that the wage
parameters are easily maximized using weighted ordinary least squares.
Step 1. Given the mth iteration parameter estimates, 
m
c , m, m, m
sJ, m, and m
 solve for the
probability that individual i's true schooling type is  sk, qm
ik for each k 2 f1;2; ;Kg.
Step 2. Solve for ^ fm
ik(~ 1; ~ 2; ; ~ J), the individual's probability density for their occupational
ability conditional on their schooling ability being  sk.
Step 3. Using qm
ik and the wage parameters, m, solve for the beliefs over occupational ability bm
it
for each  sk.
30Step 4. Update the population parameters m+1, m+1
sJ , m+1, and m+1
 with ^ fm
ik(~ 1; ~ 2; ; ~ J)
and qm
ik.
Step 5. Maximize the reduced form probabilities 
m+1
c given qm
ik, the beliefs bm
it, and expected
wages using m. (Although it is sucient to exibly express the reduced form choice prob-
abilities as only a function of the data, since the EM allows us to get estimates for the
unobserved beliefs and expected wages, these will be included also).
Step 6. Do weighted OLS for each occupation j 2 f1;2; ;Jg to update m+1
j and m+1
j













< 1e   4.
3.3 Second Stage: Solving the Dynamic Discrete Choice Problem
With the rst stage estiamtes, we now move to estimating the structural utility parameters. From
the rst stage, we have recovered consistent estimates of the beliefs, ^ bit and the wage parameters, ^ :
all which play an important role in solving the structural model. Although the problem is simplied
by recovering these parameters outside of the structural model, estimating the dynamic discrete
choice model is still extremely complicated because evaluating the choice probabilities requires
solving the individual's expected future value associated with each choice. In order to address this
overwhelming state space problem, I utilize the method of conditional choice probabilities (CCP's)
developed by Hotz and Miller (1993) and Arcidiacono and Miller (2010) to avoid having to solve
the model at every point in the state space.







ln(Pr(ditjxit;^ bit;  sk;; ^ )) (36)
where  are the structural utility parameters and the hatted variables are estimated in the rst
stage. The choice probabilities in equation (36) are taken with respect to the unobserved, per-
period random utility shock ". Assuming these unobservables are distributed i:i:d: type-I extreme
31value, we can use the conditional value functions in equation (10) in section 2.3 to express these
probabilities.






vict() = uict(Sit) + E[Vt+1(Sit+1;"t+1)jSit;dit = c]
The expected future value term E[Vt+1()] is a complicated function of all potential future career
sequences, where the expectation is taken over all possible ability signals in the current and future
periods, as well as next periods and all future non-pecuniary choice specic utility shock, ". Rust
(1987) shows that given that these utility shocks are additively separable in the utility function
and that they are type-I extreme value, the expectation with respect to next periods utility shock









where  is Euler's constant
The term vic0t+1 represents the conditional value function of choice c0 in the next period and the
sum is over all feasible choices.
Hotz and Miller (1993) show that if the expression inside of the log is multiplied top and
bottom by exp(vict+1(S)), for any choice c, then the expected future value term can be equivalently



















+ vict+1(S) + 
=   ln(
c(S)) + vict+1(S) +  (38)
where 
c(S) is the conditional choice probability of making choice c given state S.
While the Hotz and Miller (1993) choice probability inversion is helpful in solving for E[Vt+1()],
we are left to evaluate the next periods choice specic valuation function, vict+1(S), which contains
the expectation of the two period ahead value function EVit+2(S0;"0jS;dit+1 = c). Again, not being
able to compute this value, we need an alternative representation. One approach would be to apply
equation (38) again, however it is clear that using CCP's in this manner will require us taking the
problem out all the way to the terminal period T.
Arcidiacono and Miller (2010) demonstrate that dynamic models that possess the property
of nite dependence can utilize CCP's in a way which does not require solving the model to the
terminal period. In fact, with nite dependence, only a few period ahead CCP's are required. Finite
dependence takes advantage of two features of the problem. First, equation (38) holds true for any
choice c, meaning that with J +2 choices, there are J +2 equivalent ways of expressing E[Vt+1()].
The second feature is that in estimating any discrete choice model, only dierences in utilities
matter. The idea proposed by Arcidiacono and Miller (2010) is that if we strategically express
the expected future value term as a sequence of choices such that when we dierence two value
functions the remaining expected future value dierences out, then we can estimate the structural
model, requiring only a few period ahead CCP's. In the case of the model proposed here, we need
to look at two period ahead conditional choice probabilities.
In estimation, I normalize all of the value functions against the unemployment choice. Therefore
33the probability functions are





Finite dependence suggests expressing the above conditional value functions strategically so
that the three period ahead expected future value term dierences out. This strategic dierencing
is done for every possible choice. To demonstrate how this works, I will outline the expression for
the conditional value of working in occupation 1, (i.e. c = 1), subtracting the conditional value
function of unemployment in the same period. Given there are J +2 choices which can be made in
the next period, we can express today's value function of choosing occupation 1 in J +2 ways. If we
apply the conditional choice probability inversion to replace the expected future value in the next
period, then there are (J + 2)2 equivalent ways we can express the conditional value of choosing

































0;(ageit + 3);(exprj + 1);d
0
it+2 = u;1g
1  N(Eit(i1);Vit(i1) + 
2
1)
which represents the sequence fd0
it = occupation 1;d0
it+1 = unemployment;d0
it+2 = unemploymentg,
where the primes (0) represent a potential sequence. Sa1;Sa2;Sa3 represent how the state space
evolves one, two, and three periods ahead respectively, given this potential sequence. For the
worker, what is relevant three periods away, is that they will be three years older than they were
at S0, they will have one more year of occupation 1 experience, they will have been unemployed in
the previous period, and they will have received one ability signal for occupation 1.
Likewise, there are (J +2)2 equivalent ways we can dene the conditional value of being unem-




































0;(ageit + 3);(exprj + 1);d
0
it+2 = u;1g
1  N(Eit(i1);Vit(i1) + 
2
1)
Finite dependence shows up in the fact that the expected state vector three periods away for






EVit+3(Sb3)). When we dierence these
two expressions of the conditional value functions to estimate the parameters, the unknown value



































where the the ow utility for unemployment is normalized to zero (i.e. uiut = 0).
This representation of the dierenced value function reduces down to an expression which
contains only the contemporaneous utility functions and conditional choice probabilities. Repeating
this strategic dierencing for each of the other choices, we can get an expression for the structural
utility model without directly solving the optimization problem, or doing any backwards recursion
from the terminal period.
The conditional choice probabilities were estimated in the rst stage. Plugging these values in
as data, I use the expressions above for the dierenced conditional value functions to solve for the
structural utility parameters,







ln(Pr(ditjxit;^ bit;  sk;; ^ ; ^ 
c)) (43)
354 Data Extract and Summary: NLSY97
The model is estimated using the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY97). The NLSY97 is a nationally representative sample of men and women who were born
between 1980 and 1984. These individuals were between the ages of 12 and 18 at the time of their
rst interview in 1997, and respondents are interviewed annually. I use rounds 1 to round 12 for
the analysis, where the respondents are between the ages of 23 and 29 in round 12.18 On an an-
nual basis, interviewers collect detailed information on the respondent's education and employment
activities retrospectively to the date of the last interview.
Based on the responses to the retrospective education and employment questions, each year
an individual is assigned to one of twelve mutually exclusive activities: unemployment, school-
ing, or employment in one of 10 occupations f 1-Management, business, and nancial operations
occupations, 2-Professional and related occupations, 3-Other Service occupations, 4-Food Service
occupations, 5-Sales and related occupations, 6-Oce and administrative support occupations,
7-Construction and extraction occupations, 8-Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations,
9-Production occupations, 10-Transportation and material moving occupationsg.
The assignment of activities was done sequentially, starting with education. If the individual
reports attending school for ve out of the 12 months in a year for high schoolers (four out of 12
months for college students) and reported an increase in their highest grade completed between
interviews, then they were categorized as enrolled in school for the period.19 If information is not
available for the entire year, for example in their last interview round, then the attendance in the
available months was converted to a 12 month equivalent and the same criteria applied. In addition,
in the last round, no information is available regarding whether they completed a grade that year,
18Round 13 is the most current round available. This survey was conducted in 2009. Including year 2009 had
drastic eects on the unemployment rate of these workers, which calls into question the stationarity assumption of
the structural choice parameters. Conceivably it is possible to allow for aggregate shocks into the model, but that is
outside the scope of this paper. However, the round 13 information was used to supplement the round 12 data where
possible to provide a more complete picture of the individuals activities in round 12, rather than relying on a partial
years worth of data.
19In a few cases grade completion was hard coded to more accurately reect school progression. For example, if the
individual reported attending college for two years but did not report a grade increase in the subsequent year, but
reported skipping a grade two periods away (i.e. 12, 12, 14), then the middle year was re-coded as 13, assuming they
were continually in school rather than dropping out and then skipping a grade. Only a handful of records required
this scrutiny.








1 0010-0950 Management, business, and nancial operations occupations
0010-0430 Management occupations
0500-0950 Business and nancial operations occupations
2 1000-3540 Professional and related occupations
1000-1240 Computer and mathematical occupations
1300-1560 Architecture and engineering occupations
1600-1960 Life, physical, and social science occupations
2000-2060 Community and social services occupations
2100-2150 Legal occupations
2200-2550 Education, training, and library occupations
2600-2960 Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations
3000-3540 Healthcare practitioner and technical occupations
3 3600-3950; Non-Food Service Occupations
4200-4650 3600-3650 Healthcare support occupations
3700-3950 Protective service occupations
4200-4250 Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations
4300-4650 Personal care and service occupations
4 4000-4160 Food preparation and serving related occupations
5 4700-4960 Sales and related occupations
6 5000-5930 Oce and administrative support occupations
7 6000-6940 Construction and extraction occupations
6000-6130 Farming, shing, and forestry occupations
6200-6940 Construction and extraction occupations
8 7000-7620 Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations
9 7700-8960 Production occupations
10 9000-9750 Transportation and material moving occupations
so attendance was the sole criteria in determining the schooling category.
If the respondent did not meet the school enrollment criteria and reported working at least 25
weeks in the year in a job working at least 20 hours per week, then the individual was consid-
ered employed. Again, if the individual was not present for the entire year, the weeks observed
where converted to an annual equivalent. If the individual worked multiple full-time jobs, then the
attributes of the job with the most full-time weeks was assigned for that year. For each job, the
respondent identies the 3-digit 2002 Census occupation code and hourly compensation rate. Given
the reported 3-digit occupation, the individual is assigned to one of the 10 occupation categories
following table 1. Wage is assigned using the hourly compensation rate of pay, which includes all
forms of monetary compensation aliated with the job and is deated using the consumer price
index to year 2002 dollars.
The main purpose of utilizing the estimation strategy outlined in the previous section is that
the computational diculty only grows linearly in the number of occupations in the model. In this
37sense, the empirical model can accommodate a larger choice set than the ten aggregated occupation
codes described above. However, what prohibits us from analyzing occupations at a ner level of
detail is sample size. In the current specication all of the wage parameters and choice parameters
are occupation specic. Including the cross-occupational correlation terms, the technology shock
standard error, and other parameters, each occupation is associated with about 27 parameters.
Without additional assumptions (e.g. forcing the wage returns to education to be constant across
occupations), we require a reasonable amount of observations in these occupations to identify
the parameters. The ten occupation categories where drawn such that each occupation category
provided at least 350 wage observations and categories were consistent with the 2002 occupation
classication system. Table 1 shows how the 2002, 1-digit census occupation codes map to the ten
occupations used in the empirical analysis. Six of the 10 occupation groups contain a single 1-digit
occupation code. Two of the ten only combine two 1-digit occupation codes. Only professional and
other service occupations combine multiple 1-digit occupation codes.
If an individual is not assigned to schooling or one of the 10 occupation employment activities,
then they are assigned to unemployment (or home production).
The analysis focuses on the white male cross-sectional sample from the data. This group consists
of 2,284 individuals. The discrete decision period corresponds to the school year (September to
August). The decisions of individuals are continually tracked from age 16 (t=1) until round 12
unless any one of ve events occur: 1) the gap between interview dates exceeds 16 months, 2) if
their highest grade completed or degree completed is invalid from the survey data, 3) the individual's
primary activity was employment, but no occupation was reported or the reported wage was less
than $5 per hour or greater than $100 per hour, 4) they joined the military, or 5) reported completing
20 or more years of education.20 Of the original population, 2,125 individuals survive to age 16, with
the nal sample containing 15,198 person year observations, averaging 7.15 years per individual.
Table 2 summarizes the distribution of activities by age, as well as the number of observations
at each age. As expected, unemployment for these young workers is relatively high ranging between
20There appear to be a large fraction of medical students who meet the employment criteria with 20 years education.
Mean wages increase monotonically across education levels except for 19 years to 20 years where the average wage




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3910-15%. The share of employment is not even across the 10 occupations. At age 24 when about
half of the population is still in the sample, the largest shares of employment are in professional,
sales, or construction occupations. Management, oce, and transportation have about average
representation. And, service, food, maintenance, and production have below average shares.
Table 3 describes in greater detail the employment activities of white males between the ages of
16 and 28. For each of the ten occupation categories, table 3 reports the top four, 3-digit detailed
occupation codes, as well as the percentage of observed employment records in those occupations.
For food, sales, and transportation occupations, the top four detailed occupations represent more
than 70% of the employment records in those categories, implying that white males are more
concentrated in a handful of 3-digit occupation codes. Comparably, only 25% of employment
records are represented by the top four detailed occupations in professional occupations, suggesting
that workers are much more spread across the 3-digit detail occupations in professional occupations.
Previous papers modeling career decisions, (e.g. Neal (1999); Pavan (2009); Kambourov and
Manovskii (2009)) using the NLSY79 or Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data have docu-
mented the high potential for measurement error when the reported occupation code is take directly
from the data. To avoid counting false career changes these papers impose a number of edits on
the occupational data. The primary edit is to not consider any occupational change unless it is
accompanied by a change in employer. Yamaguchi (2010) points out that this may be an undesir-
able restriction on the data as it is likely to exclude important career changes as individuals are
promoted within the rm.
The NLYS97 is unique from the NLSY79 and PSID in that it likely does not suer from system-
atic measurement error in the reported occupation. The NLSY97 is conducted with a computer-
assisted interview system which allows interviewers to reference back to the responses of their
previous years interview. Interviewees are rst read their previous years job description and are
asked if that continues to dene their job function. The occupation code only changes if they report
a change in duties. Pavan (2009), using the NLSY79 data, cites evidence of spurious reported occu-
pation changes by the fact that 40% of individuals remaining with the same employer in consecutive
periods report a change in 3-digit occupations. The analogous gure for the NLSY97 data at the
40Table 3: Description of Occupation Categories
Occupation Categories (# of
3- digit census codes)
Top-Four, 3-digit Occupations










Managers, all other (11.8)





Computer software engineers (7.7)
600 24.5% Computer Support Specialist (6.3)
Secondary School teachers (5.7)




412 60.7% Janitor (15.3)
Security Guard (14.1)
Nursing/Home health aides (10.2)
Food preparation and serving
related occupations (13)
Cooks (35.7)
620 71.8% Waiters (16.0)
Sup. Food Prep. (11.1)
Food Prep. (9.0)
Sales and related occupations
(18)
Retail salesperson (28.0)
724 75.8% Cashier (22.0)
Sup. Retail sales (19.6)















Auto tech/ mechanic (24.3)
452 48.5% HVAC mechanic/installer (10.0)
Computer/oce machine repair (7.3)
Auto body repair (6.9)
Production occupations (81)
Production worker (15.0)
547 43.7% Assembler/frabricator (12.3)
Welding/soldering worker (9.5)
Metal worker/ plastic worker (7.0)
Transportation and material
moving occupations (34)
Laborer and freight movers (32.8)
739 77.0% Driver/Sales, truck driver (22.7)
Cleaner of Vehicle/equip. (11.6)
Industrial trk/tractor operator (9.9)
41Table 4: Employer and Occupational Mobility for Individuals working in t and
t+1
(percent)
Same Employer t + 1 Di. Employer t + 1 Total (row percent)
(col. percent)
Same Occupation (10









3-digit detail level is only 12% of workers. This is a reasonable gure representing mobility within
rms. The fact that this number is not overstated provides reasonable assurance of the reliability
of the observed occupation changes. This feature makes the NLSY97 particularly desirable for a
model that looks at a ner level of occupational choice.
Table 4 provides details on the mobility of this cohort of workers. The table shows that even
using the broader 10 occupation categories, workers have a 30% chance of working in a dierent
occupation in adjacent periods. Most notable is that 17% of occupation changes at the 10 category
level occur within the same rm. These occupation changes would otherwise be ignored using the
previous literature's edits.
5 Results
One of the primary deliverables of the model is the estimates of the distributional parameters
and correlation across occupational abilities. These estimates are found in table 5. The rst
row reports the standard deviation of the unconditional, marginal ability distribution for each
occupation. Given that ij enters additively in the log-wage specication, these values have a
direct interpretation as the percentage dierence in wages, all else equal. For example, the ability
standard deviation for sales is 0.33. This means that an individual with a sales ability match at one
standard deviation above zero will receive a 33% higher wage than an individual who's sales ability
is at the mean. These numbers represent the potential gains from search, where an individual can
potentially realize very large wage increases simply by nding an occupation they are well suited
42for.
The second row in table 5 contains the estimate of the covariance of schooling ability and
occupational ability. Using the expression in equation (3) for the initial beliefs regarding occupa-
tional ability conditional on schooling ability, we get an interpretation for this parameter. Since
Ei1(ij) = sJ(j)is, we interpret the estimates of sJ(j) as the expected match value for an individ-
ual with schooling ability at one standard deviation in the distribution. For example, an individual
at one standard deviation in the schooling distribution will expect wages in professional occupations
to be 16% higher due to their ability compared to an individual at the -1 standard deviation in the
schooling ability (2  0:0816), holding constant the level of education.
The lower triangular matrix in table 5 is the estimated correlation matrix across occupational
abilities. With the exception of one element, this matrix is uniformly positive, implying an under-
lying element of general ability that is persistent throughout the correlation matrix. This means
that when a worker learns they are good at one thing, they are likely to be good at everything.
The single exception is between schooling ability and transportation workers. The negative covari-
ance suggests that those with high schooling ability will likely be less productive in transportation
occupations, holding the level of schooling constant.
Looking across this correlation structure we detect some additional patterns that surface from
the data. For example the second largest correlation, that between sales occupations and oce
and administrative occupations (0.7361), is between occupations often dened by the 2002 census
code as a single occupation "Sales and Oce Occupations". This is to say that the census has
likely grouped these occupations based on the assumption that these occupations share a similar
set of skill requirements. Given the estimated high correlation coecient, the data suggests there
may be some merit to this claim (although they are not perfectly correlated). The same holds true
between production occupations and maintenance and repair occupations, which has the highest
correlation of (0.7448).
One of the drawbacks of the raw correlation matrix is that it provides little information regarding
the relative correlation between any two elements, meaning that a spurious correlation could exist

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44occupation. As an example, it may not be clear why sales occupations and production occupations
have a correlation of (0.4787). One possibility is that the skills required are common across these two
occupations, so a high ability in one implies a high ability in the other. The second possibility is that
they share no skill requirements and the entire correlation is driven by the fact that sales occupations
are correlated with maintenance and repair occupations, and likewise production occupations are
also correlated with maintenance occupations. So any relationship we observe between sales and
production is due entirely to their relationship to maintenance and repair.
To address this issue, table 6 compares the correlation of two occupations in isolation, margining
out the eect of the other J   2 occupations. This procedure isolates the direct correlation eect
and removes the secondary eects mentioned above. The most striking result from table 6 is that
about one-third of the the correlation pairs are now negative. These negative numbers have the
implication that it is possible for workers to learn they are good in an occupation, by actually
learning they are bad at another occupation.
For example, returning to the paired correlation between sales occupations and production
occupations, in table 6 it is (-0.4245). This is in contrast to the (+0.4787) found in the full
correlation structure in table 5. An example of what these numbers mean is that if a worker learns
they have a high ability in maintenance occupations, looking at table 5, they will infer that they
have among other things, a high ability in sales occupations and production occupations. The
fact that the conditional correlation between sales and production is negative means that if the
worker then moves to a production occupation and discovers a poor match, then their belief about
their sales match will actually increase. The idea in simple terms is that assume there are two
components that make up ability for maintenance and repair occupations, one that is related to
sales and one that is related to production. By only observing their maintenance and repair ability,
the worker cannot disentangle which source is driving their high ability. Once they learn that it
is not the production portion by gaining production experience, they then infer that it is actually
the sales component, increasing their expectation of their sales ability.
The estimates of the wage parameters are presented in table 7. Given the non-linear way













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































46returns based o of the estimates. The wage estimates suggest an interesting trade-o workers
may face highlighted in Miller (1984), which is between occupations with high expected wages and
low variance versus low expected wages, but high variance in unknown abilities. For example, a
white male high school graduate choosing their rst occupation in construction can expect about
15% higher wages than if they worked in a sales occupation. However, the standard deviation in
unknown occupational ability for sales occupations is about 20% higher than construction, implying
their are potentially more informational benets from sales occupations.
The structural choice estimates are in table 8. The coecient of relative risk aversion, , is
estimated at 2.433. This gure represents a moderate level of risk aversion and is consistent with
other ndings in the literature on individual's risk preferences (e.g. Mehra and Prescott (1985)). In
comparison to the entry costs, the estimated level of risk aversion implies that it is a less signicant
search friction. Entry costs vary across occupations. The main entry cost, j2, measures the cost to
nding work in an occupation if they were not engaged in that occupation in the previous period.
An additional entry cost, j3, is incurred if the worker also has no experience in that occupation.
Production occupations have the highest entry costs for a new worker of all of the occupations .
Given the marginal utility of income at entry level wages, the entry costs for production occupations
of ( 1:952 5:193) is equivalent to about $26,000, which is more than the entry level annual salary.21
The entry costs for an individual who is returning to a production job, is much less at about $7,000,
or about 1/3 of an annual salary. This gure makes since if 4 months is the approximate time it
takes to secure a job in production.
Food service on the other hand has the lowest entry costs for new workers with no food service
experience, with a dollar equivalent of about $2,000. Those returning to food service face entry
costs of about $4,400. Given that re-entry costs are double the initial entry costs implies workers
are more reluctant to return to food service after leaving than they were to initially work in it. It




 . With entry level wages at about $9.20, the marginal utility of wages is 0.5425. This



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.930 6:462 8:441 4.012 9:590
(4.545) (3.845) (4.263) (4.247) (4.262)
Entry Cost (dt 1 6= j), j2
 2:922  2:059  2:329  1:199  2:097
(0.382) (0.286) (0.231) (0.187) (0.205)
No Experience (Exprj = 0),
j3
-0.119  3:025 -1.287 0.635  1:708












9:118 8:739 13:636 13:878 10:488
(4.281) (4.068) (4.271) (4.604) (4.177)
Entry Cost (dt 1 6= j), j2
 1:635  1:423  2:441  1:952  1:766
(0.180) (0.163) (0.262) (0.208) (0.177)
No Experience (Exprj = 0),
j3
 2:552  3:179  3:997  5:193 -1.189
(0.943) (0.962) (1.258) (1.123) (0.992)
Utility Over Income and Riskb
Coef. on Wages, w 120.031 [7.350 , 1797.669]
Rel. Risk Aversion,  2.433 [1.285 , 3.806]
Schooling
Constant, s1 4:453 (0.924)
College Attendance, s2  3:828 (0.754)
Re-entry HS, s3  3:519 (0.200)
Re-entry Col., s4  1:289 (0.106)
Schooling Ability, s5 0:751 (0.243)
a  is xed to 0.95. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are constructed by 180
bootstraps of the model.
b Bracketed numbers represent the 95% condence interval of the parameter estimate from the
180 bootstraps.
** Denotes signicance at the 5% level.
* Denotes signicance at the 10% level.
49food service) are reasonable in comparison to the previous literature's estimates given that these
occupations are typically aggregated together into blue collar occupations.
Entry costs may be more or less relevant in the context of the occupation specic non-pecuniary
constant, j1. Even though production has the largest entry costs, if also has the largest non-
pecuniary benet, leaving it on net the occupation with the third highest (behind transportation
and maintenance) non-pecuniary benet for new entrants (13.878-1.952-5.193). This very large
constant means that once workers have experience in production, and in particular worked in
production in the previous period, they are very likely to work in production in the next period.
This pressure to continue in the occupation from the previous period functions as a major friction
to sorting on ability, where even workers who receive poor information on their ability will be
reluctant to seek out a better match.
Turing to the results on schooling preferences, on average individuals receive a positive utility
for attending school, with a substantial reduction in utility for attending college. At median, entry
level wages, with marginal utility of wages equal to 0.5425, the disutility of college of -3.828 implies
a cost of about $14,000 per year of college. Schooling ability signicantly eects the decision to
attend school. The coecient estimate of 0.751 implies that an individual at plus one standard
deviation in the schooling ability distribution receives the equivalent of a $2,800 tuition subsidy
compared to an individual at the mean.
6 Analysis: Occupational Choice, Sorting on Ability, and Wages
This section explores in greater detail the importance of sorting on ability in observed occupational
choices. The large variances of the occupational ability distribution indicate that workers have
much to gain about learning where they fall in each distribution. However, in reality, there are
a myriad of factors in addition to sorting on ability that drive occupational choice. Using the
parameter estimates, we can simulate career paths to gain much needed insight into the aptitude
of workers to sort on ability and perhaps more importantly the eect that sorting on ability has on
wage growth.










j(i;t) represents the individual's optimal choice strategy given the state at time t. This
measure has a nice interpretation in that as it moves away from their average match, it implies that
the worker is choosing a match with certainty. For example if the ex-ante expected ability equals
their maximum (or minimum) ability, then we can say that they are choosing their maximum (or
minimum) ability with certainty.
The empirical model is robust in the sense that it allows many other factors not relating to
ability to inuence occupational choice (e.g. entry costs and risk aversion), meaning that the model
does not require people to sort on ability. Therefore, on an individual level, if we see a worker choose
their maximum occupation with certainty we cannot say for sure that this is driven by sorting on
ability because this outcome could be driven by outside factors. 22 However, the theoretical ability
matching model, in the absence of search frictions, says that the fraction of workers whose ex-ante
expected ability equals their maximum ability should continually improve over time. If we observe
this trend in the data on an aggregate level, then this suggests that sorting on ability is relevant
to occupational choice. However, if other factors dominate the workers aptitude to sort on ability,
then there will likely to no discernible patterns in the ex-ante expected ability.
To see what trends (if any) exist in the data I simulate 1 million careers using the parameter
estimates. Rather than looking at the full distribution of abilities, for each worker their set of ten
ability matches are grouped into three categories: O1 3 corresponds to the range of the individual's
top three occupational abilities, O7 10 corresponds to the range of the individual's worst three
occupational abilities, and the remaining category, O4 6, includes the ability levels that are not
in the best three or worst three. Table 9 tracks the fraction of workers who's ex-ante expected
22For example, they could have learned that this is their highest ability and are thus sorting into that occupation.
Alternatively, they could be a high school drop out, and perhaps it is a common rule for all high school drop outs to
go into transportation occupations, of which this individual happens to have their highest match in transportation.
Another possibility is that workers always choose occupations at random and then stay in that job forever. In this
workers case that just happened to be their high ability occupation. The rst explanation entails the worker sorting
on ability, while the later two explanations are driven by strictly random search processes.
51ability falls in each segment of the distribution of their abilities. The analysis is broken down
by educational attainment because these workers have very dierent priors, occupational search
patterns, and labor market attachment.
It is important to understand what table 9 is measuring. It is the ex-ante expected ability, not
the ex-post. Therefore, the column Pr(  2 O7 10) does not measure the fraction of workers who
choose an occupation in their bottom three ability ex-post, it is the fraction who are likely choose
one of their worst occupations ex-ante. To draw the distinction, assume workers choose occupations
completely randomly (i.e. with probability of choosing each occupation, 1=J). Then ex-post, 30%
of workers will end up in one of their three worst occupations. This fraction is not very informative
because these workers ended up in these occupations completely unintentionally. The measure we
are interested in, Pr(  2 O7 10), is the fraction of workers who intentionally, or in some sense,
are likely to choose one of their worst three occupations. In the context of the random decision
model, this value is zero because the randomness implies that ex-ante their match is likely in the
middle of the distribution. Looking at ex-ante expected ability is a way to separate intentional and
unintentional occupational sorting on ability.
The ex-ante expected match at zeros years of labor market experience is quite dierent across
educational categories. The table shows that nearly all (96.6%) of high school gradates with zero
years of labor market experience have an expected match in the middle range of their match values.
It is not surprising that the overwhelming fraction of high school entrants have an expected ability
in the middle of their ability distribution since they are new entrants. However, given initial choices,
2.4% will end up in one of their top three occupations, and 1.0% end up in one of their bottom
occupations. It is also not surprising that these fractions are not equal and biased toward the upper
end of the distribution. What this means is that high school graduates have priors that will on
average put them in a higher ability occupation. Therefore, given however high school graduates
choose occupations, there are 2.4% that are likely ending up in one of their best matches and only
1.0% ending up in a poor match.
However, given that these are new entrants into the labor force, it is likely that the large pooling
in the middle of the distribution is due to the fact that sorting on ability at this stage of the career
52Table 9: Occupational Sorting by Labor Market Experience and Education
Labor Market
Experience (Yrs.)
Education Group Pr(  2 O7 10)
a Pr(  2 O4 6) Pr(  2 O1 3)
b
Less Than HS
0 1.9% 86.9% 11.2%
1 7.4% 72.9% 19.7%
2 7.6% 71.4% 21.0%
3 7.6% 70.6% 21.8%
4 7.6% 69.6% 22.7%
5 7.8% 68.9% 23.3%
6 7.8% 68.0% 24.2%
7 8.0% 67.1% 24.9%
8 8.4% 65.9% 25.7%
HS
0 1.0% 96.6% 2.4%
1 8.8% 77.3% 13.9%
2 10.0% 73.2% 16.8%
3 10.8% 70.3% 18.9%
4 11.3% 68.1% 20.7%
5 11.8% 66.1% 22.2%
6 12.2% 64.1% 23.7%
7 12.5% 62.4% 25.1%
8 12.6% 61.4% 26.0%
9 13.2% 59.5% 27.4%
College
0 8.9% 74.8% 16.3%
1 14.8% 61.4% 23.8%
2 16.2% 58.0% 25.8%
3 16.7% 56.3% 27.0%
4 16.6% 55.6% 27.8%
5 16.1% 55.3% 28.6%
a The fraction of individuals likely to choose one of their worst three occupational abilities.
b The fraction of individuals likely to choose one of their top three occupational abilities.
53is more or less unintentional (random).
The dierence between 2.4% and 1.0% is likely inconsequential. However, for high school drop
outs we see the same pattern, but on a much larger and more convincing scale. Given their optimal
choices, 11.2% have an expected match that falls within the range of their top three occupational
matches prior to any labor market experience. This is evidence that for these workers, their
priors really matter. Given their knowledge of their schooling ability and correlation structure,
they are able to narrow down which occupations they are likely to have high (or low) ability and
most importantly showsstrong evidence that they are sorting (intentionally) on this information.
Conversely, only 1.9% have an expected match in the range of their bottom three abilities.
College graduates show a similarly strong pattern in their initial priors, with 16.3% likely to
choose one of their top three occupational abilities, even having no labor market experience. What
is interesting is that this number is only twice as large as the fraction of college graduates who
are likely to choose one of their worst three occupations (compared to 6 times as large for high
school drop-outs). What's driving these 8.9% of college graduates to choose one of their three
worst occupations is unclear. Two possible explanations are that college graduates tend to choose
occupations with higher variances in abilities (managers/ business operations and professionals),
or that they knowingly have a poor match but choose the occupation for other reasons (e.g. they
provide high returns to education).
The table tracks the changes in this distribution across labor market experience. The largest
change in these percentages occurs between zero years and one year of labor market experience.
With one year experience, individual choices become much more heterogeneous. For high school
graduates, 8.8% will likely choose one of their three worst occupational matches, up from 1.0% when
they have zero years labor market experience. What drives this large increase is the switching costs
in the model. For workers with no labor market experience that randomly initially choose one
of their worst occupations, the switching costs in the model suggest that these workers are likely
to stay in this occupation despite the low match. Given that these workers are likely to choose
this poorly matched occupation again, their ex-ante expected ability will fall accordingly and the
fraction of workers who are likely to work in one of their three worst occupations will increase.
54For high school graduates we observed a 7.8 point increase in the fraction of workers in one of
their worst matches between zero and one year experience. For these same workers we observe a
11.5 point increase in the fraction who are likely to work in one of their best occupations. This
asymmetric increase gives positive evidence that, although workers face switching costs, sorting on
ability has a dominant role in occupational choice. Looking further down the career with 9 years
labor market experience, 27.4% of high school graduates are likely to work in one of their top three
occupations. Comparatively only 13.2% are likely to work in one of their worst three. This strongly
indicates that sorting on ability plays an important role in occupational decisions.
High school graduates show the largest gain in the fraction expecting to work in one of their
top three occupations over the initial stages of their career. A similar pattern exists for high
school drop outs and college graduates, however, since these workers relied more heavily on their
priors, the gains from learning in the labor market where not as large. The more asymmetric
these distributions become over time, implies a greater importance of intentional sorting on ability
in making career decisions. The asymmetry can be measured as the fraction of workers likely to
work in one of their top three occupations versus the fraction likely to work in one of their bottom
three. By this measure, sorting on ability is most important for high school drop outs. At ve
years experience these workers are nearly three times more likely to be working in one of their
top three occupations compared to one of their bottom three occupations. Comparatively, high
school gradates are twice as likely and college gradates are 1.75 times as likely. This high fraction
of college graduates in low matches (16.1%) suggests that additional factors play an important role
for occupational decisions of college graduates other than sorting on ability. One attributing factor
may be that college graduates may choose a particular occupation not because they have a high
ability in that occupation, but because the returns to college are high in that occupation. If they
exercise exibility in occupational choice, they may forgo some of the returns to education.
To assess the wage gains associated with ability sorting, I will only focus on the match com-
ponent of wages, ij, which measures the percentage contribution of ability to wages. We are
interested in looking at how the average match value evolves over the career. Table 10 shows the
expected value of ij at dierent points in the career for high school graduates. Given the optimal

















(a) (b) (c) (d)
0 -0.1% 0.5% 0.3% 1.1%
1 2.4% 3.5% 1.8% 1.1%
2 2.9% 4.0% 2.2% 1.2%
3 3.3% 4.4% 2.5% 1.3%
4 3.9% 4.9% 2.8% 1.6%
5 4.4% 5.4% 3.2% 2.0%
6 5.2% 6.1% 3.9% 2.7%
7 6.1% 6.8% 4.5% 3.4%
8 6.5% 7.1% 4.8% 3.8%
9 7.5% 8.0% 5.6% 4.7%
decisions rules 
j(i;t), which is the probability that individual individual i chooses occupation j,













Table 9 indicated that priors beliefs did not likely play a role in initial occupational decisions
for high school graduates. As we can see in table 10 the expected match value for high school
graduates with zero years labor market experience is essentially zero, providing further evidence
that these high school graduates possess little information to sort on ability. However, as their
careers' progress, the average ability increases steadily by 0.5% to 1.0% per year such that with
nine years labor market experience, on average, 7.5% of wages is due to sorting on ability for
high school graduates. Given that table 9 shows that 13.2% of high school graduates are in one
of their worst three matches, there is likely a lot of heterogeneity underlying this average ability.
However, an average increase in wages of 7.5% is a sizable contribution to wage growth and for
most occupations greater than the return to one year of college.
A second important aspect of the model is to look at how individuals second best options are
evolving over time. The correlated learning structure suggests as workers become more informed
56about their ability in their current occupation, they will likely have more information about their
abilities overall. Specically, if workers are forced out of their number one occupational choice,
they will be able to compensate for this loss using the information they have acquired. This is in
contrast to the results generated from the independence assumption, where a job-loss results in the
destruction of the entire 7.5% wage gains.
To analyze if individuals' second best choices are improving with labor market experience, we
will look at the dierence in the expected match for those who are employed, who are forced out
of their preferred occupation and forced into an alternative occupation. These values are reported
for high school graduates in table 10. The expected match for high school graduates conditional on
working reported in column (b) is slightly higher at all levels of labor market experience compared to
the population average because those who actually choose employment are likely to do so because
they have on average a higher ability. The column (c) shows the expected match if these same
workers were forced out of their rst choice occupation into a second choice. One option for these
workers is to exit the labor force. Column (c) reports the expect ability allowing some workers to
exit the labor force. While the second best choice for these workers is almost always less than the
expected match of their primary occupation, the expected ability in the second best occupations
is able to keep pace with the growth in the expected ability for the primary occupation. Rather
than losing the entire average 8.0% for employed high school graduates with 9 years labor market
experience, if displaced, these workers will move into occupations with an expected ability of 5.6%,
implying only a moderate loss of wage due to lower matched occupation of -2.4%.
Column (d) shows the expected ability if all of these workers are forced to nd new occupations
(i.e. workers are not allowed to exit the workforce). The expected ability of this population is lower
than the case when we allow for exits, implying that the individuals that are most likely to exit
the labor force do so because they do not have a suitable second best option. While this number
is lower, it is still quite large, where workers are able to recover a sizable amount of their loss in
wages due to matching through correlated learning.
Table 11 shows the wage gains for the other education groups. College graduates appear to
have the highest expected ability match, contributing to 9.1% of wages at ve years of labor market
57Table 11: Wage Gains (in percent) Due to Sorting on Ability by Edu-
cation
E(ij)
Labor Market Experience (Yrs.) Less than HS High School College Grad.
0 -3.7% -0.1% 7.1%
1 -1.6% 2.4% 8.8%
2 -0.9% 2.9% 8.4%
3 -0.3% 3.3% 8.3%
4 0.4% 3.9% 8.5%
5 1.1% 4.4% 9.1%
6 2.0% 5.2% {
7 3.0% 6.1% {
8 4.0% 6.5% {
9 { 7.5% {
Random Match Values -5.6% 0% 3.9%
a Labor market experience for high school drop outs begins at age 16, age 18 for
high school graduates, age 19 for some college, and age 22 for college
graduates.
b The probability that an individual with a given level of education and labor
market experience chooses an occupation possessing one of their worst three
abilities.
c The probability that an individual with a given level of education and labor
market experience chooses an occupation possessing one of their top three
abilities.
experience. However this number does not truly reect the gains of sorting. Given the positive
correlation structure, college graduates are likely to be much better in any of the occupations. We
would expect their average match value to be positive regardless of the decision rule they used. The
bottom row of table 11 shows the expected match value if individuals chose occupations with equal
probability. For high school graduates the expected ability at zero years experience is identical
to the expected match if individuals randomly choose occupations, suggesting in some sense again
that these workers have little information to base their initial choices on.
College graduates on the other hand have an expected match of of 3.9% if they choose occu-
pations at random, implying an average wage gain of 5.2% (9.1-3.9) due to occupational sorting.
What is perhaps most interesting is that the majority of these gains, 3.2%, are realized before these
workers have any labor market experience and only achieve an additional 2% on average once in the
labor market. This means that for college graduates, priors play a very important role in sorting
on ability.
58High school drop-outs show a similar story. If this group where to choose occupations randomly,
this would imply an expected occupational match of -5.6%, suggesting that these workers are in
general, lower ability. However, given their prior information, they are able to improve their
position in the labor market by an average of about 2.0% percentage points. Although not as large
as college graduates, initial sorting is relevant for high school drop outs. After nine years labor
market experience high school dropouts have an expected ability value of 4.0% implying a gain on
average of 9.6% (4:0 + 5:6).
The collection of results from the simulations begin to describe in detail how sorting on ability
eects occupational choices and wage growth. In general the results show strong evidence that
workers sort into occupations where they have higher ability as they learn through labor market
experience. These results vary widely across educational groups, where high school drops out
appear to the be most likely to move out of poorly match occupations. College graduates on the
other hand are much more likely to stay in occupations where they have very low ability. The
fact that either group would choose to stay in a poorly matched occupation highlights the role of
other non-pecuniary factors which drive occupational decisions in addition to sorting on ability.
The exact factors leading to the asymmetric sorting on ability by education level remains for future
study. As high school drop outs are the most likely to sort on ability they are able to increase
wages by 9.5% with 9 years labor market experience. High school graduates and college graduates
increase wages 7.5% and 5.2% respectively.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops and estimates an individual model of occupational choice and learning that
allows for correlated learning across occupation specic abilities. Flexibly allowing information
to enter the worker's mobility decision in this manner broadens the type of career moves that
occupational matching models can address. Specically, the model is able to capture both lateral
occupational moves and vertical occupation moves, where high ability individuals change careers
due to promotion. More generally, the model not only addresses what drives individuals to change
careers, but also how information eects their decision of what new occupation to go to.
59Endogenizing information in this way signicantly increases the computational burden. I ad-
dress these empirical challenges by utilizing the Expectation and Maximization (EM) algorithm to
uncover the persist, high dimensional unobservables in the data. This approach is particularly well
suited for the learning framework as it breaks the curse of dimensionality so the computational
complexity only grows linearly in the number of occupations. The empirical strategy likely has
broad applicability to other learning models.
The model is estimated on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997. The parameter
estimates suggest that workers can potentially realize large wage gains by nding occupations they
are well suited for. The model allows for heterogenous priors over the distribution of ability. These
priors are strongly related to educational attainment, which plays an important role in driving
initial occupational choices. Using the parameter estimates I simulate careers to gain insight into
the importance of sorting on ability in occupational decisions and it's eect on wage growth.
The simulations suggest that workers willingness to sort on ability is highly related to educational
attainment, where high school drop-outs are most likely to choose occupations based on ability, and
college graduates are the least likely to sort on ability. This nding provides some understanding as
to why college graduates are observed in the data to be less likely to change occupations compared
to other cohorts.
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62A Mispecication Bias: Aggregating Occupations
This section discusses the mispecication bias in the ability matching model if occupations are
coarsely aggregated into blue collar and white collar as is typically done in the occupational choice
literature. When occupations are aggregated, this assumes that the ability vectors are perfectly
correlated. To the degree that this is not true, many of the structural parameters will be biased.
For example, the returns to tenure will be overstated. If workers are actually searching among
many occupations, which the econometrician assumes is only one occupation, then the returns to
search will be perceived as returns to work experience. In a similar way, the average match quality
will be upward bias. Since people are selecting their highest match among multiple occupations,
which the econometrician assumes are one.
Less obvious will be it's eect on the variance parameters of the model. Inappropriately aggre-
gating occupations will downward bias the variance on occupational match quality. The estimator
will compensate for the downward bias in the ability variance by upwardly biasing the variance of
the technology shock. This bias can be demonstrated with a simple stylized model.
Assume their are two occupations (1,2) that the econometrician aggregates into a single occu-
pation. Each worker observes one ability signal from each occupation parameterized as follows for
algebraic ease.
wi1 = i1 + "i1; i1  N(0;2);"i1  N(0;2)
wi2 = i2 + "i2; i2  N(0;2);"i2  N(0;2)
and E(i1i2) = 
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63Given these values for the population, we can derive the population variance of match quality
V (~ ) =E(~ 2)
=E
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< 2 if  < 2 or CORR(i1;i2) 6= 1
Turning to the bias on the technology shock, since the total variance of wages is V (w) = 2,
subtracting the estimate for V (~ ), V (") is,






> 2 if CORR(i1;i2) 6= 1
Given the high value of understanding sources of wage variation, the distribution of abilities and
the selection problems stated earlier, these sorts of biases are extremely undesirable. Therefore, it
is important that we push the empirical model to accommodate as many occupations as possible.
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